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Abstract 
 
Our assessment of the competitiveness of the Hong Kong economy from various 
perspectives indicates that the overall competitiveness of Hong Kong economy has 
been improving during the past several years. However, from a longer term historical 
perspective, there are still a number of areas in which Hong Kong’s competitiveness 
has been eroded relative to her main competitors in East Asia, especially in export 
sector. On the aggregate level, although Hong Kong’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
growth rate is amongst the best performers in East Asia in the recent years, it has been 
adversely affected by the continuing relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing 
production to the Mainland China. On sectorial levels, although Hong Kong’s unit 
labour costs started to decline since 2000 comparing to her Asian competitors, the unit 
labour cost-based real effective exchange rate continues to appreciate against her 
major trade partners. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s competitiveness deteriorated in 
several important categories of goods and service exports. Overall, our study shows 
that the Hong Kong economy still maintains its resilience to outside shocks, 
nevertheless it needs to explore new areas to fuel its future growth.
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of 
the Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre. 
2 Hongyi Li is Associate Professor at Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics at Chinese 
University of Hong Kong; Xiangdong Wei is Professor of Economics at Lingnan University; Danyang 
Xie, the team leader for this project, is Professor of Economics and Senior Wei Lun Fellow at Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
Our assessment of the competitiveness of the Hong Kong economy from various 
perspectives indicates that the overall competitiveness of Hong Kong economy has 
been improving during the past several years. However, from a longer term historical 
perspective, there are still a number of areas in which Hong Kong’s competitiveness 
has been eroded relative to her main competitors in East Asia, especially in export 
sector. On the aggregate level, although Hong Kong’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
growth rate is amongst the best performers in East Asia in the recent years, it has been 
adversely affected by the continuing relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing 
production to the Mainland China. On sectorial levels, although Hong Kong’s unit 
labour costs started to improve since 2000 comparing to her Asian competitors, the 
unit labour cost-based real effective exchange rate continues to appreciate against her 
major trade partners. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s competitiveness deteriorated in 
several important categories of goods and service exports. Overall, our study shows 
that the Hong Kong economy still maintains its resilience to outside shocks, 
nevertheless it needs to explore new areas to fuel its future growth. 
 
 
1. TFP Analysis 
 
Our analysis indicates that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate had been 
declining during the 1990’s largely due to the hollowing out of the manufacturing 
industry in Hong Kong. Such a decline was also aggravated by the Asian Financial 
Crises in years 1997-1999. However, a strong rebound of the TFP growth rate took 
place in 2000 and this rebound was further fueled by the signing up of CEPA in 2003, 
which gave Hong Kong a huge boost of confidence. In the past 3 years, our TFP 
growth rate is amongst the best performers in East Asia.  
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Figure 1 below plots the HP-filtered TFP growth rates for Hong Kong (HKG) and her 
major competitors, China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Singapore (SGP), and Taiwan 
(TWN), which gives a visual comparison. More specifically, our econometric 
analyses reveal that the Asian Financial Crises did not seem to have a long lasting 
impact on Hong Kong’s TFP. But they did have a transitory adverse impact during 
1997-1999: it lowered Hong Kong’s TFP growth by about 0.5% to 0.65% per year for 
each of these three years. On the other hand, the effect of CEPA appears to be very 
positive and robust, raising Hong Kong’s TFP growth by approximately 1.5 
percentage points per year since 2003. The declining of the manufacturing industry 
has a negative impact on TFP growth rate: one percentage point reduction in the 
manufacturing share in total GDP lowers the TFP growth rate by 0.4 percentage 
points. This impact is largely expected as the manufacturing sector normally has faster 
productivity growth than services.  
 
Figure 1. Comparison of TFP Growth Rates (HP filtered) 
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2. Unit Labour Cost Analysis 
 
In terms of unit labour cost, Hong Kong became more expensive than her Asian 
competitors during the midst of the Asian Financial Crises (Figure 2). The situation 
has improved recently, largely due to the drastic decline of the unit labour cost in the 
service sector (Figure 3). Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s unit labour cost-based real 
effective exchange rate continues to appreciate (Figure 4) due to declining unit labour 
costs in her major trade partners.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of GK-PPP-adjusted Unit Labour Cost 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Service Sector Unit Labour Cost Index (2000 = 100) 
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Figure 4. Hong Kong’s REER and Unit Labour Cost-based REER 
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Dynamic Shift-Share Analysis of Competitiveness in Goods and Service Exports 
 
The following tables, which are based on our dynamic shift-share analysis (henceforth 
the DSSA), summarize the direct comparison of performance between Hong Kong 
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and the Asian competitors in both merchandise and service exports. In merchandise 
exports, when China is in the reference group, Hong Kong’s loss of competitiveness 
amounts to an accumulated 28 billion USD between 1992 and 2004. When China is 
excluded from the reference group, Hong Kong’s loss is reduced to 1.2 billion USD. 
Nevertheless, Hong Kong scores consistently behind Korea and Singapore whether or 
not China is in the reference group. When China is excluded from the reference group, 
Hong Kong performs relatively well in SITC 76 (telecommunication and sound 
equipments) and SITC 84 (clothing), but does poorly in SITC 776 (transistors) and 
SITC 75 (office equipments). 
 
Table 1. Cumulative Net Shift between 1992 and 2004 including China 
SITC HKG KOR MYS SGP THA TWN CHN
65 -4,064 -2,365 -2,737 -5,262 -455 -1,887 16,771
75 -13,000 -6,456 -207 -10,801 -2,263 -13,099 45,826
76 -594 9,719 -7,238 -13,389 -3,107 -12,775 27,385
776 -6,456 -3,378 3,405 20,977 -2,303 5,487 -17,732
84 -3,944 -9,745 -4,146 -6,541 -2,002 -7,890 34,268
Overall -28,059 -12,224 -10,924 -15,016 -10,130 -30,164 106,516
Note: In millions of USD. China is in the reference group. Destination market: the World.  
 
Table 2. Cumulative Net Shift between 1992 and 2004 excluding China 
SITC HKG KOR MYS SGP THA TWN
65 241 729 -449 -2,064 617 926
75 -1,366 2,145 6,208 -2,157 650 -5,480
76 6,250 14,758 -3,465 -8,004 -1,360 -8,179
776 -11,254 -6,601 1,129 17,526 -3,459 2,659
84 4,898 -3,457 396 128 197 -2,162
Overall -1,232 7,575 3,820 5,429 -3,354 -12,237
Note: In millions of USD. China is excluded from the reference group. Destination market: the World.  
 
Hong Kong’s mediocre performance in the DSSA results from the deteriorating 
competitiveness of domestic exports. The re-export as a separate export centre in fact 
does an excellent job in keeping up with its competitors, at least since 2000. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the total exports have lost ground in all destination markets, 
the USA, the EU, Japan, even the Mainland China market, is a source for concern. 
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Table 3. Cumulative Net Shift between 1995 and 2004 including China 
Services HKG KOR MYS SGP THA CHN
Transportation -4,273 7,091 -2,123 -211 -1,305 821
Travel -5,773 -3,221 2,834 -6,384 283 12,260
Insurance 63 225 275 845 116 -1,524
Finance 112 450 -37 394 -268 -652
Other Business 3,075 -4,690 -3,374 -910 -4,076 9,974
Overall -6,796 -145 -2,424 -6,265 -5,249 20,880
Note: In millions of USD. Destination market: the World.  
 
In service exports, Hong Kong has been losing competitiveness overall, largely due to 
the accumulated loss in net shift incurred in transportation and travel that totaled 10 
billion USD. The gains in competitiveness in financial and insurance service exports 
are quantitatively unimportant. The only bright spot is the other business service 
exports which are mainly trade related (see Table 3 above). 
 
 
Policy Implication 
 
In our view, further integration measures with the Mainland should be fostered. Given 
the minimal size of the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong, the only way to maintain 
a healthy TFP growth is to promote innovation in the service sector. Besides 
innovations in financial sector and logistic industry, Hong Kong should promote 
innovations in sports, travel, culture, and entertainment industry as well. Labour 
market flexibility remains important for maintaining Hong Kong’s competitiveness. 
Policies that target export growth in high-tech industry (SITC 776 for instance) may 
be considered. Partnership with Guangdong (Shenzhen in particular) to develop 
high-tech manufacturing is the right way forward as it utilizes both sides’ comparative 
advantages. It would enable Hong Kong to maintain some manufacturing activities, 
especially those up-stream ones, such as research and development, and hence could 
help Hong Kong maintain high economic growth.  
 
END OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. Despite the collapse in July 2006 of the WTO Doha “Development” Trade 
Round, globalization trend sees no sign of abating. To survive in a world “flattened” 
by globalization, competitiveness of an economy has become increasingly crucial. In 
this report, we assess the competitiveness of the Hong Kong economy from three 
different angles: the productivity change, the unit labour cost, and export performance. 
On each of these aspects, we examine Hong Kong’s performance in terms of changes 
over time as well as the comparisons with her East Asian competitors.  
 
2. We conduct the analysis of the productivity change based on estimates of total 
factor productivity (TFP). The TFP growth captures the part of growth in aggregate 
output that is not attributable to additions of physical capital and increases in labour. 
The idea is that the economic growth that comes from additions of capital and 
increases in labour will eventually be subject to the law of diminishing returns and 
hence will be unsustainable. The economic growth that originates from the 
improvement of TFP, for instance, technological innovations, managerial innovations, 
new business ideas, as well as human capital accumulation, can be sustainable.  
 
3. High labour cost is commonly viewed as one main reason for the deterioration 
of the competitiveness of an economy. However, high labour cost may not indicate 
low competitiveness if matched by high productivity. So we need to take into account 
both labour cost and productivity when assessing the competitiveness. The unit labour 
cost, defined as the ratio of real output over total labour compensation, serves the 
purpose. We estimate Hong Kong’s unit labour cost both for the economy as a whole 
and for different sectors. This enables us to see not only how the unit labour cost 
changes over time but also how it varies across different sectors. Furthermore, using 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted real output figures, we calculate Hong 
Kong’s unit labour cost along side with its major competitors in East Asia for 
comparisons. We also compile a measure of Hong Kong’s real effective exchange rate 
using unit labour costs as deflators. We then study the impact of the changes in the 
real effective exchange rates on Hong Kong’s exports.  
 
4. To evaluate Hong Kong’s export competitiveness vis-à-vis its Asian 
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neighbours, we run a detailed dynamic shift-share analysis (DSSA), for both 
commodity exports and service exports. The DSSA allows us to assess in which 
export categories Hong Kong gains or loses competitiveness and in which periods 
such gains or losses have been incurred. Also, the DSSA can illustrate whether the 
gains and losses are quantitatively important.  
 
5. The rest of the report is organized as follows. In section II, the main results of 
the TFP analysis are presented. In section III, we focus on unit labour costs. In section 
IV, we report the findings of the DSSA. Section V provides concluding comments as 
well as policy discussions. Technical details of data and methodological issues can be 
found in the Appendices. 
 
II. TFP Analysis 
 
6. The total factor productivity (TFP) is a concept that captures the change of 
output not accounted for by changes of inputs. Growth accounting exercises aiming at 
disentangle the TFP can be dated back to the 1957 seminal paper of Robert Solow, 
Nobel Laureate of 1987. Solow studies the US economy and concludes that 87.5 
percent of the increase in gross output per man hour during the period of 1909-49 is 
attributable to technical changes.  
 
7. The interest on TFP analysis was revived in 1992 with Alwyn Young’s study 
on Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), in particular on Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Young (1992) found that Hong Kong’s TFP growth for the period 1971-90 
was much greater than that of Singapore, suggesting that Singapore’s rapid growth 
during the period is unlikely to sustain. Subsequently, other researchers have 
examined Hong Kong’s TFP growth using various empirical approaches and found 
mixed results (Kim and Lau 1994, Collins and Bosworth 1996, Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare 1997, Hsieh 2002, Iwata, Khan, and Murao 2003, Ferreira, Pessoa 
and Veloso 2005, and Li 2006). In this report, we update these studies and go further 
to ask whether Hong Kong’s TFP growth is affected by structural change of the 
economy, integration with China, and the Asian Financial Crises. 
 
8. The data and methodological issues regarding TFP are gathered in Appendix 1. 
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Let us focus on the main results here. Our analysis on TFP indicates a slowdown as 
Hong Kong’s manufacturing production relocates to the Mainland China, a temporary 
setback during the Asian Financial Crises between 1997-1999 and a rebound as the 
integration measures with the Mainland China such as CEPA, which helped to boost 
confidence of the local economy and revive the manufacturing sector3. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of TFP Growth Rates (HP filtered) 
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9. Figure 1 above plots the HP-filtered TFP growth rates for Hong Kong and her 
major competitors, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, which gives a visual 
comparison. These HP-filtered series are calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter to the estimated TFPs from growth accounting. As explained in the 
technical appendix, such a filtering procedure helps to bring out the major trends in 
the estimated TFPs. The figure shows that the Mainland China out-performed all these 
economies over this period. Hong Kong’s performance was among the best of the 
NIEs before 1990, but became the worst amongst the NIEs in the entire 1990s. It 
started to recover from 2000, and has retained the leading position amongst the NIEs 
since 2002. Table 1 further gives the average TFP growth rates, breakdown by 5-year 
periods. It is clear from the table that Hong Kong had serious difficulties during the 
period of 1995 to 1999. Hong Kong’s TFP then bounced back strongly and performed 
the best among the NIEs during the period of 2000-2004. 
 
                                                 
3 Domestic consumption, investment and manufacturing production bounced back sharply in 2004 
after the implementation of CEPA.   
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Table 1. Average Growth Rates of TFP by Countries 
Average Growth rate by Period Economy 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
China 4.023 4.479 4.690 3.777 3.414
Hong Kong 0.999 2.178 0.828 -0.396 1.515
Korea -0.144 1.797 1.171 0.751 1.050
Singapore 0.443 2.003 2.625 0.677 -0.887
Taiwan 0.875 2.695 1.922 0.734 0.426
 
To understand better the historical performance of Hong Kong’s TFP, we run a series 
of econometric models. The results are summarized below: 
 
Table 2. Regression Analysis of TFP (Dependent Variable: TFP) 
Independent variables Model I Model II Model III 
Constant -8.876 (8.27)*** -8.379 (8.575)*** -8.683 (8.067)***
Trend .347 (7.628)*** .334 (8.684)*** .355 (8.509)***
Manufacturing Share in GDP 
(%) 
.403 (10.081)*** .382 (10.296)*** .390 (9.489)***
CEPA Dummy (2003-2005=1) 1.699 (5.643)*** 1.543 (5.534)***
CEPA Dummy (2004,2005=1) 1.539 (4.552)***
Asian Financial Crisis Dummy 
(=1 from 1997) 
-.049 (.179)
Asian Financial Crisis Dummy 
(1997-1999=1) 
-.511 (2.148)** -.640 (2.460)**
Adjsuted-R2 .890 .910 .889
DW-Statistic 1.746 2.038 1.836
ADF test of the residuals -4.545*** -5.068*** -4.317***
Sample period: 1980-2005 
Note: t-statistics are in the brackets. ** significant at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level. 
     
10. The comparison of Models I and II suggests that the Asian Financial Crises do 
not seem to have a long lasting impact on Hong Kong’s TFP. But they do have a 
transitory adverse impact during 1997-1999. In this period, the Asian financial crises 
lowered Hong Kong’s TFP growth by about 0.5 to 0.65 percent per year. In all the 
three models, the effect of integration measures such as the CEPA appears to be very 
robust, raising Hong Kong’s TFP by 1.5 percent per year. The table above also shows 
that the declining of the manufacturing industry has a negative impact on TFP growth 
rate: one percentage point reduction in the manufacturing share in total GDP lowers 
the TFP growth rate by 0.4 percentage points. This impact is largely expected as the 
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manufacturing sector normally has faster productivity growth than services.   
 
III. Unit Labour Cost 
 
11. It is widely recognized that Hong Kong faces high labour cost amongst its 
major competitors in East Asia now. Many observers in the investment community 
express concern that this high labour cost may seriously undermine Hong Kong’s 
competitiveness position in the world. While high labour cost is an important factor 
affecting an economy’s competitiveness, almost equally important is the productivity 
levels of that economy. So it will certainly be mistaken to evaluate an economy’s 
competitiveness by only looking at its labour cost.  
 
12. A widely used index to compare different countries’ competitiveness is the 
unit labour cost index. This is simply the measure of the labour cost needed to 
produce one unit of output. It can also be interpreted as the ratio of average labour 
compensation per employee over the average productivity per employee. As both the 
productivity factor and the labour cost factor have been taken into account when 
calculating this unit labour cost, it can better reflect the true competitiveness of an 
economy.  
 
13. In this part of the study, we intend to calculate the unit labour cost for Hong 
Kong and its major competitors at both the aggregate and the sectoral levels. By so 
doing, we hope to address the following set of questions. First, what is the trend of the 
overall unit labour cost in Hong Kong? Second, what are the trends of the unit labour 
costs for different sectors in Hong Kong? Third, how do the changes in unit labour 
costs in Hong Kong compare to those of its major competitors in East Asia? Finally, 
how do the changes in unit labour cost compare with those of its major trade partners?  
 
The ULC for Hong Kong  
 
14. We find that the unit labour cost for Hong Kong climbed steadily between 
1980 and 1998, at an average growth rate of 7.7 percent, and then reversed course 
equally steadily (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Unit Labour Cost Index for Hong Kong (1992 = 100) 
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15. A closer look at the disaggregate level reveals that the trend reversal is brought 
about by the decline of the unit labour cost in the service sector, especially in 
communication services, trade services, and finance and insurance sector (see Figure 
3 and Table 3). 
 
Figure 3. Unit Labour Cost Index by Sectors (1992 = 100) 
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Table 3. Average Growth Rate of Unit Labour Cost by Sectors 
Average Growth Rate  
ULC Index 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Import/Export 11.92 6.14 4.24 1.92 -7.70 
Hotel and Restaurants 11.59 5.63 11.99 5.99 -0.94 
Transport and Storage 9.37 4.89 7.16 1.50 -1.08 
Finance and Insurance 17.44 10.46 2.21 4.45 -7.15 
Business Service 14.48 6.49 9.73 0.64 1.19 
Manufacturing 3.38 2.55 -2.02 -2.53 0.08 
Wholesale and Retail 9.08 6.52 7.85 4.25 -2.91 
Communication 11.46 1.96 1.73 4.77 -16.37 
Real Estate 12.94 18.49 22.14 7.48 -0.68 
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16. It is worth noting that the real estate sector was the one that witnessed the 
highest average growth rate in unit labour cost. This was mainly due to the sharp 
rising of total labour compensation accompanied by declining in labour productivity 
in this sector.   
 
International Comparison of ULC 
 
17. First, we compare the unit labour costs for Hong Kong, the Chinese Mainland, 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, taking the economy as a whole. We use the 
Geary-Khamis method to obtain purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment to make 
the comparison of these unit labour costs meaningful. (See Figure 4.) We find that to 
no one’s surprise, China has by far the lowest unit labour costs. For the rest of the 
economies, we observe convergence in unit labour costs toward the end of 1980s. 
Since then the unit labour costs went on divergent paths, with Hong Kong surpassing 
Singapore and became the least competitive during the midst of the Asian Financial 
Crisis as Hong Kong dollar, which was linked to the US dollar, appreciated strongly 
against the currencies of other economies. Recently, the convergence process in unit 
labour costs seems to have resumed as Hong Kong’s unit labour cost in the service 
sector declines and the unit labour cost in Korea rises. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of PPP-adjusted Unit Labour Cost  
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18. Although the Mainland China has the lowest level of the unit labour cost in 
this comparison, it is nevertheless of interest to see whether this advantage is 
strengthening or weakening over the years. To do so, we convert the ULC into index 
by setting the index value to 100 for year 2000. The figure below (Figure 5) shows 
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that during the early periods of reform in China, its unit labour cost declined, but this 
cost has been steadily increasing since 1994. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of PPP-adjusted Unit Labour Cost Index (2000 = 100) 
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19. A closer look at the disaggregate level data finds that China’s unit labour cost 
in the manufacturing sector continues to decline until 2002 and then shows a small 
increase. China’s service sector however sees a strong upward trend in ULC since 
1992. The two figures below (Figure 6 and Figure 7) suggest that while the gap in the 
unit labour costs in the service sector between Hong Kong and the Mainland China 
closes somewhat since 1998, the gap in the manufacturing sector widens for most of 
the years, which may reflect a fast catching up of manufacturing productivity in the 
Mainland. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Manufacturing Unit Labour Cost Index (1992 = 100) 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Service Sector Unit Labour Cost Index (2000 = 100) 
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ULC-based REER for Hong Kong  
 
20. Despite the recent decline in unit labour costs in Hong Kong, its real effective 
exchange rate (REER) deflated by the unit labour costs continues to rise, as in Figure 
8. The Figure also shows the traditional REER (which is deflated by consumer price 
index). The traditional REER shares very much the same pattern with ULC-based 
REER up until 1999. But the two rates diverged afterwards, reflecting the fact that in 
relative terms the declining of Hong Kong’s ULC has not been as sharp as its price 
level with comparison to its major trade partners.  
 
Figure 8. Hong Kong’s REER and ULC-based REER  
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21. To get a sense of the effect of the real effective exchange rates on Hong 
Kong’s exports, we carry out the regression analysis of export growth (both total and 
domestic goods export) on ULC-based REER or traditional REER, respectively. The 
results are shown in Table 5 below. It turns out that both the ULC-based REER and 
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the traditional REER have no effect on either total export or domestic exports growth 
in Hong Kong. This may have something to do with the change of Hong Kong’s 
export structure, which is now becoming increasingly dominated by export of services 
and offshore trade4. These regressions suggest that the real effective exchange rates, 
although should not be ignored in studies of competitiveness, are nevertheless less 
crucial to export performance in Hong Kong.  
 
Table 5. Regression of ULC-based REER and REER on Exports 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Growth Rate of 
Total Exports 
Growth Rate of 
Domestic Exports
Panel A. Regression of ULC-based REER on Exports 
Constant -2.795 (-0.364) -0.132 (-0.022)
Growth Rate of Main Trade Partner’s GDP 4.482 (3.111)*** 3.283 (2.670)**
Growth Rate of Unit Labour Cost based REER -0.358 (-0.629) -0.111 (-0.236)
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.234 
DW Statistics 2.180 1.919
Panel B. Regression of Traditional REER on Exports 
Constant -3.734 (-0.445) 0.151 (0.023)
Growth Rate of Main Trade Partner’s GDP 4.347 (2.452)** 3.115 (2.235)**
Growth Rate of Traditional REER -0.090 (-0.179) -0.104 (-0.265)
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.236
DW Statistics 2.130 1.930
Sample Size (period) 23 (1982-2004) 
Note: All series are stationary at 5% level (ADF). ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. t-statistics 
are in the brackets. An AR(1) error term is added to correct for possible serial correlation in the 
regression residuals. 
 
 
IV. Dynamic Shift-Share Analysis on Export Performance 
 
22. The performance of the export sector is important to the economic growth of 
Hong Kong. Domestic merchandise exports, re-exports earnings, and service exports 
were about 10%, 26%, and 35% of GDP, respectively, in 20055. Furthermore, about 
half of the exports of services are related to merchandise trade. Thus, competitiveness 
of merchandise exports is an important component of any assessment of the 
                                                 
4 The weights used to calculate Hong Kong’s REER are only based on merchandize trade not service 
trade.  
5 Re-export earnings are defined as margins from re-export activities. 
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competitiveness of the whole economy. Often the real effective exchange rate is used 
to measure the competitiveness of exports. However, as shown above, the real 
effective exchange rate does not capture the effect of structural changes in the 
economy on exports. An alternative way is to examine the structural changes in the 
composition of exports over time and derive the implications for export 
competitiveness. The so-called dynamic shift-share analysis (DSSA) is often used for 
this purpose (see MAS Occasional Paper 23, 2002). 
 
23. A shift-share analysis compares export growth by commodity between Hong 
Kong and a set of reference economies, which export broadly similar categories of 
goods to similar markets. In this setting, growth of exports of a commodity may be 
attributable to a broad-based increase in external demand (e.g. an increased demand in 
the US in general would raise exports from Hong Kong as well as from the reference 
economies such as Singapore) and/or an improvement in Hong Kong’s 
competitiveness relative to the reference economies (which would raise Hong Kong’s 
exports to the common market at the expense of the reference economies). The 
shift-share analysis offers a quantitative tool to disentangle these two sources of 
growth in exports. Specifically, it compares changes in Hong Kong’s exports of a 
commodity with the corresponding exports of the reference economies. Any 
remainder of Hong Kong’s export change between periods after removing the part that 
might be ascribed to the rate of export growth of the reference group – the share 
effect – is referred to as the net shift. A positive net shift implies an improvement in 
competitiveness for Hong Kong relative to the reference economies, and a negative 
value indicates deterioration in its competitiveness.   
 
24. The shift is further accounted for by three additive factors: (a) industry mix 
effect; (b) competitive effect; and (c) interaction effect. To fix idea, we will call an 
export industry a sunrise industry if the export of this industry from the reference 
group to a common destination market grows over time. The opposite is called a 
sunset industry. Also, when we state that Hong Kong is overweight in an industry, it 
means that the export of this industry from Hong Kong as a percentage of Hong 
Kong’s export is greater than the average percentage of the reference group. With 
these terminologies in mind, the industry mix effect is positive if Hong Kong is 
overweight in a sunrise industry or underweight in a sunset industry. The competitive 
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effect is positive if Hong Kong’s export growth rate in an industry is greater than the 
average growth rate of the reference group. The interaction effect is positive if Hong 
Kong’s export is overweight in an industry and grows faster than that of the reference 
group (strengthening the lead) or Hong Kong’s export is underweight in an industry 
and grows slower than that of the reference group (abandoning this industry). The 
interaction effect is negative if Hong Kong’s export is overweight in an industry and 
grows slower than that of the reference group (losing the lead) or Hong Kong’s export 
is underweight in an industry and grows faster than that of the reference group 
(catching up from behind). It is common that the three effects go in different 
directions and what matters is the net shift. Nevertheless, the DSSA helps identify 
what factors, the IME, the CE, or the IE, have caused the rise and fall in the net shift.  
 
25. We conduct DSSA for both the merchandise exports and the service exports. 
To conduct DSSA, we need to specify the environment: the export subcategories, the 
reference group, and the destination markets. For merchandise exports, we select 
those subcategories that are most important for Hong Kong, namely SITC 65 (textiles), 
SITC 75 (office equipments), SITC 76 (telecommunication and sound equipments), 
SITC 776 (transistors), and SITC 84 (clothing)6. The exports of these five categories 
account for more than 70 percent of Hong Kong’s total merchandise exports in 2005. 
For service exports, we have data for 5 subcategories: transportation, travel, finance, 
insurance, and other business services (mostly trade-related). The reference 
economies for merchandise exports are China, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. The reference economies for service exports are the same except that 
Taiwan has to be removed from the group due to data limitation. We experiment with 
several destination markets such as the USA, the EU, Japan, China, and the World as 
a whole. The DSSA generates a great deal of charts, most of which are left in 
Appendix 3 for easy reference. In the following, we will summarize the major 
findings in a few tables and figures. 
 
Merchandise Exports 
 
26. In terms of cumulative total net shift, which measures the gain or loss of an 
                                                 
6 SITC is the Standard International Trade Classification system. For more details on the items covered 
under SITC 65, 75, 76, 776, and 84, see Appendix 3. 
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economy’s competitiveness in the five selected merchandise exports subcategories, 
Hong Kong is the worst performer in the EU market, and second worst performer in 
the US and Japan markets (see Figures 9-11). Note that the shift effect is a flow 
concept. Therefore, these Figures do not indicate that Hong Kong has the lowest level 
of competitiveness, only that Hong Kong has been losing competitiveness over the 
sample period being considered.  
 
Figure 9. Cumulative Total Net Shifts of Export to US Markets 
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Figure 10. Cumulative Total Net Shifts of Export to EU Markets 
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Figure 11. Cumulative Total Net Shifts of Export to Japan Markets 
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27. These figures show that the Mainland China is the biggest gainer in export 
competitiveness, in all the destination markets. If we exclude China from the 
reference group, the DSSA results change somewhat. In particular, Korea and 
Singapore now perform better than Malaysia and Thailand. This suggests that China 
competes more directly with Korea and Singapore and thus the presence of China in 
the reference group hurts the performance of Korea and Singapore more than it hurts 
Malaysia and Thailand. The robust conclusion that we can draw from these exercises, 
as shown in the tables below when we use the World as the destination market, is that 
Hong Kong always ranks as one of the worst performers overall with or without 
China in the reference group. The relative rankings among the 4 NIEs in terms of the 
overall competitiveness gains remain robust with or without China in the reference 
group, namely, Korea (the strongest gainer), Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (the 
worst performer). 
 
 
Table 6. Rankings of Changes in Competitiveness Including China  
 Note: Destination Market: the World; China is in the reference group. 
 
Table 7. Rankings of Changes in Competitiveness Excluding China 
  Strongest Gainers     Worst Gainers 
 SITC 1 2 3 4 5 6 
65 TWN KOR THA HKG MYS SGP  
75 MYS KOR THA HKG SGP  TWN 
76 KOR HKG THA MYS SGP  TWN 
776 SGP TWN MYS THA KOR  HKG 
84 HKG MYS THA SGP TWN KOR  
Overall KOR SGP MYS  HKG THA TWN 
 Note: Destination Market: the World; China is excluded from the reference group. 
 
  Strongest Gainers       Worst Gainers 
SITC  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
65 CHN THA TWN KOR MYS HKG SGP 
75 CHN MYS THA KOR SGP HKG TWN 
76 CHN KOR HKG THA MYS TWN SGP 
776 SGP TWN MYS THA KOR HKG CHN 
84 CHN THA HKG MYS SGP TWN KOR 
Overall CHN THA MYS KOR SGP HKG TWN 
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28. The above two tables also show that Hong Kong does relatively well in SITC 
76 (telecommunication and sound equipments) and 84 (clothing), and does poorly in 
SITC 65 (textiles), 75 (office equipments), and 776 (transistors). In order to 
understand the reasons behind these gains and losses, we compiled two more tables 
below to show the accumulated net shifts in millions of US dollars. 
 
Table 8. Cumulative Net Shift between 1992 and 2004 Including China 
SITC 
IME 
HKG
CE 
HKG 
IE 
HKG
Net 
HKG
Net 
KOR
Net 
MYS
Net 
SGP
Net 
THA 
Net 
TWN 
Net 
CHN
65 1,088 -4,378 -774 -4,064 -2,365 -2,737 -5,262 -455 -1,887 16,771
75 -12,343 -880 223 -13,000 -6,456 -207 -10,801 -2,263 -13,099 45,826
76 3,813 -3,321 -1,086 -594 9,719 -7,238 -13,389 -3,107 -12,775 27,385
776 -11,145 7,026 -2,337 -6,456 -3,378 3,405 20,977 -2,303 5,487 -17,732
84 5,215 -5,745 -3,414 -3,944 -9,745 -4,146 -6,541 -2,002 -7,890 34,268
Overall -13,372 -7,298 -7,389 -28,059 -12,224 -10,924 -15,016 -10,130 -30,164 106,516
Note: In millions of USD. China is in the reference group. Destination Market: the World 
 
 
Table 9. Cumulative Net Shift between 1992 and 2004 Excluding China 
SITC 
IME 
HKG 
CE 
HKG 
IE 
HKG
Net 
HKG
Net 
KOR
Net 
MYS
Net 
SGP 
Net 
THA 
Net 
TWN
65 681 -410 -30 241 729 -449 -2,064 617 926
75 -10,269 13,377 -4,474 -1,366 2,145 6,208 -2,157 650 -5,480
76 2,637 3,530 83 6,250 14,758 -3,465 -8,004 -1,360 -8,179
776 -17,274 11,051 -5,032 -11,254 -6,601 1,129 17,526 -3,459 2,659
84 139 2,141 2,618 4,898 -3,457 396 128 197 -2,162
Overall -24,086 29,689 -6,834 -1,232 7,575 3,820 5,429 -3,354 -12,237
Note: In millions of USD. China is excluded from the reference group. Destination Market: the World 
 
29. To illustrate, let us focus on the case when China is excluded from the 
reference group. It is clear from this table that Hong Kong’s largest loss (-11.3 billion 
USD in net shift) is in SITC 776 (transistors). The reason for the loss is that even 
though Hong Kong has been growing faster than the group average and thus the 
competitiveness effect (CE) is positive (11 billion USD), Hong Kong is nevertheless 
very much underweight in a sunrise industry and the industry mix effect (IME) is 
hugely negative (-17.3 billion USD). In addition, since Hong Kong is catching up 
from behind, the interaction effect (IE) is negative (-5 billion USD). The following 
table shows how far behind Hong Kong still is underweight in SITC 776: 
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Table 10. Export Weights in Subcategories 
SITC Group 1992 Group 2004 HKG 1992 HKG 2004
65 0.179 0.083 0.226 0.109
75 0.217 0.268 0.113 0.216
76 0.212 0.243 0.183 0.282
776 0.160 0.326 0.065 0.201
84 0.232 0.081 0.413 0.192
Note: Export weight in a subcategory is the ratio of export in this subcategory to the sum of exports in 
all 5 subcategories. 
 
30. Since Hong Kong’s export in SITC 776 grows at a faster rate than that of the 
entire reference group, the export weight in this subcategory has increased (from 6.5% 
to 20.1%) faster for Hong Kong than that (from 16% to 32.6%) for the whole group. 
Nevertheless, Hong Kong is still far underweight in this subcategory. Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Malaysia have been gaining competitiveness in SITC 776. 
 
31. Although Hong Kong’s case for SITC 75 (office equipments) shows the same 
pattern as for SITC 766, Hong Kong’s growth in this subcategory is much higher than 
the group’s (without China) so that the loss of competitiveness (the net shift) is only 
-1.4 billion USD, much smaller than the loss in SITC 776 (-11.3 billion USD). When 
China is added to the reference group, however, the loss in SITC 75 becomes the 
largest, since the addition of China raises the average growth rate of the reference 
group above that of Hong Kong’s, pushing Hong Kong’s competitiveness effect to the 
negative territory. The addition of China also makes Hong Kong’s industry mix effect 
much worse. 
 
32. On the positive side, Hong Kong has gained much competitiveness in SITC 76 
(telecommunication and sound equipments), largely at the expense of Taiwan and 
Singapore. All three effects (IME, CE, and IE) work to Hong Kong’s favor (without 
China in the reference group).  
 
33. We also separate Hong Kong’s export into domestic export and re-export and 
we are able to confirm, using the DSSA, the common perception that Hong Kong’s 
re-export has been gaining competitiveness. Nevertheless, it is clear that the loss of 
competitiveness of Hong Kong’s domestic export outweighs the gains from re-export 
so that Hong Kong’s total export has been losing competitiveness (Figure 12). The 
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advantage of the DSSA is its ability to show that Hong Kong’s loss of competitiveness 
occurred more drastically in 1993-1996 and 1999-2000 due to the continued 
deterioration of domestic export; the gain in competitiveness of the re-export sector 
has become visible only since 2001.  
 
Figure 12. Cumulative Total Net Shifts of Hong Kong Export 
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Note: China is excluded from the reference group. Destination market: the world. 
34. Furthermore, even when we use the Mainland China as the destination market, 
Hong Kong still performs badly: a phenomenon that begs explanation. Again, the loss 
of competitiveness occurred mostly in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 13. Total Net Shifts of Export to China Market 
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Note: Destination market: China. Non-accumulated total net shifts 
 
 
Service Exports 
 
35. Similar to the case of merchandise exports, Hong Kong has been losing 
competitiveness in the service export overall, as indicated by the following table. 
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Table 11. Rankings of Changes in Competitiveness Including China 
  Strongest Gainers     Worst Gainers 
 Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Transportation KOR CHN SGP THA MYS HKG 
Travel CHN MYS THA KOR HKG SGP  
Insurance SGP MYS KOR THA HKG CHN 
Finance KOR SGP HKG MYS THA CHN 
Other Business CHN HKG SGP MYS THA KOR  
Overall CHN KOR MYS THA SGP  HKG 
Note: Destination Market is the World. Sample period: 1995 to 2004. 
 
36. Hong Kong does relatively well in Other Business service exports (mostly 
trade-related) and finance service exports, but does poorly in transportation, travel, 
and insurance. The table below shows that Hong Kong’s loss in Transportation and 
Travel are quantitatively important, so as its gain in Other Business. The changes in 
competitiveness in Financial and Insurance service exports are quantitatively 
unimportant. Hong Kong’s loss of competitiveness in transportation service exports is 
due to its slower growth than the reference group (negative CE); its loss of 
competitiveness in travel is due to both its slower growth than the reference group 
(negative CE) as well as the fact that Hong Kong is underweight in this sunrise sector 
(negative IME). 
 
Table 12. Cumulative net shift between 1995 and 2004 
Services 
IME 
HKG 
CE 
HKG
IE 
HKG
Net 
HKG
Net 
KOR
Net 
MYS
Net 
SGP
Net 
THA 
Net 
CHN
Transportation 149 -4,030 -392 -4,273 7,091 -2,123 -211 -1,305 821
Travel -2,534 -3,708 468 -5,773 -3,221 2,834 -6,384 283 12,260
Insurance 202 -56 -83 63 225 275 845 116 -1,524
Finance 996 -349 -535 112 450 -37 394 -268 -652
Other Business 1,182 3,309 -1,416 3,075 -4,690 -3,374 -910 -4,076 9,974
Overall -4 -4,835 -1,957 -6,796 -145 -2,424 -6,265 -5,249 20,880
Note: In millions of USD. Destination market: the World.  
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V. Concluding Comments and Policy Discussions 
 
37. From the above analysis, we arrive at a mixed evaluation of Hong Kong’s 
competitiveness. On the one hand, the Hong Kong economy as a whole is sufficiently 
flexible and dynamic and seems to adjust well to external shocks, as evidenced by the 
short-lived impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Hong Kong’s TFP. In the face of 
globalization forces, Hong Kong has moved past the difficult period in the 1990s 
when the transition to a service economy dented the TFP growth. Embracing the 
opportunity to further integrate with the Mainland China, Hong Kong’s TFP 
rebounded strongly in recent years. On the other hand, Hong Kong’s real effective 
exchanged rate deflated by the unit labour costs continue to appreciate, which can 
potentially hurt Hong Kong’s export sector, although the empirical findings denies 
such a linkage for the time being. 
 
38. Furthermore, the direct comparison of performance between Hong Kong and 
the Asian competitors in both the merchandise and the service export indicates a case 
for concern. In merchandise exports, when China is in the reference group, Hong 
Kong’s loss of competitiveness amounts to an accumulated 28 billion USD between 
1992 and 2004. When China is excluded from the reference group, Hong Kong’s loss 
is reduced to 1.2 billion USD. Nevertheless, Hong Kong scores consistently behind 
Korea and Singapore whether or not China is in the reference group. 
 
39. Hong Kong’s mediocre performance in the DSSA results from the 
deteriorating competitiveness of domestic exports. The re-export as a separate export 
centre in fact does an excellent job in keeping up with its competitors, at least since 
2000. Nevertheless, the fact that the total export has been losing its ground in almost 
all destination markets, including the Chinese mainland market, is a source for 
concern. 
 
40. In service exports, Hong Kong has been losing competitiveness on the whole, 
largely due to the accumulated loss incurred in transportation and travel that totaled 
10 billion US dollars. Hong Kong’s gains in competitiveness in financial and 
insurance service exports are quantitatively unimportant. The only bright spot is the 
trade-related other business service exports.  
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41. In our view, further integration measures with the Mainland should be fostered. 
Given the minimal size of the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong, the only way to 
maintain a healthy TFP growth is to promote innovation in the service sector. Besides 
innovations in financial sector and logistic industry, Hong Kong should promote 
innovations in sports, travel, culture, and entertainment industry as well. Labour 
market flexibility remains important for maintaining Hong Kong’s competitiveness. 
Policies that target export growth in high-tech industry (SITC 776 for instance) may 
be considered. Partnership with Guangdong (Shenzhen in particular) to develop 
high-tech manufacturing is the right way forward as it utilizes both sides’ comparative 
advantages. It would enable Hong Kong to maintain some manufacturing activities, 
especially those up-stream ones, such as research and development, and hence could 
help Hong Kong maintain high economic growth.   
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Technical Appendix 1: TFP Analysis 
 
The Estimation of TFP 
 
The estimation of TFP typically uses the following aggregate production function: 
 
),,( ALKfY =              (1) 
 
where Y is real GDP; K is total capital stock in real terms; L is labour input; and A is 
TFP. This production function follows the normal neoclassical assumptions: (1) it 
exhibits constant return to scale; (2) it has positive and diminishing marginal products 
with respect to K and L; and (3) the technology progress is Hicks-neutral, i.e. 
A
f
A
f =∂
∂ . 
Then, if we take a natural logarithm of both side of equation (1) and differentiate with 
respect of time, we have: 
 
/ / / /K LKf LfY Y A A K K L L
Y Y
= + +?? ? ?            (2) 
 
If we assume that the factor market is perfect and so each input is paid at its marginal 
product, then 
Y
Kf K  and 
Y
Lf L  are capital share and labour share of income, 
respectively. Denoting 
Y
Kf K  and 
Y
Lf L  as Ks and Ls , respectively, and re-arranging 
terms in equation (2), we obtain: 
 
/ / / /K LA A Y Y s K K s L L= − −? ? ? ?           (3) 
 
Equation (3) gives us an estimator of the growth rate of TFP. If we further assume that 
equation (1) measures the actual real GDP with a random errorε  then the true TFP 
growth rate should also differ from the estimated TFP growth rate in (3) by this error. 
One way to get a better estimate of TFP is to apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to 
the estimated TFP from (3). This is a statistical tool to smooth the data without 
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referring to the underlying determinants of TFP. However, it may suffer the problem 
of over-estimating or under-estimating TFP when the actual TFP is high or low 
towards the end of the estimated period.  
 
The above methodology is standard in literature and has been applied by many others 
before, such as Young (1995), Collins and Bosworth (1996) and Islam, Dai and 
Sakamoto (2006). Alternatively, the estimation of TFP has also been carried out by 
estimating directly a production function (typically in the form of Cobb-Douglas or 
translog) using either a single country time series data (e.g. Young 1994) or 
cross-country data (e.g. Kim and Lau 1994). However, the latter methodology often 
suffers from the problem of simultaneity, multicollinearity and limited degree of 
freedom. Hence, we use the growth accounting approach to estimate TFP for Hong 
Kong as well as for its major competitors: the mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea 
and Singapore. 
 
The Regression of the Determinants of TFP   
 
While it is interesting to show the pattern of TFP growth, it is more important to know 
what underlying factors contributed to the changes of TFP. To do so, we can run the 
following regression. 
 
ϕα +Φ+= ZtTFP 0                (4) 
 
where 0α  is the coefficient on time trend, t. Z contains exogenous variables that 
affect the changes of TFP andΦ is its coefficients.ϕ  is a random error term. In our 
estimation for the case of Hong Kong, Z contains the share of manufacturing output in 
GDP that captures the structural change, a dummy for Asian Financial Crisis, and a 
dummy for the implementation of CEPA.   
 
The Data 
 
The implementation of the methodology presented above requires data on real GDP, 
real capital stock, labour input and capital and labour income shares.  
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GDP 
 
The figures for Hong Kong are taken from the 2005 Gross Domestic Product, a 
statistical booklet published by the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region in February 2006. For Taiwan, the data are 
extracted from the Macroeconomic Database of the National Statistics, maintained by 
the Government. For other economies, they are taken from the Penn World Tables for 
the historical series and the relevant governments’ homepages for the latest figures.  
 
Capital Stock 
 
There are no capital stock data published by the government, and only the domestic 
gross capital formation data are available. We use the same data source as that for 
GDP to get the domestic gross capital formation data, and then use the the following 
perpetual inventory method to estimate the capital stock in year t: 
 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ                (5) 
 
whereδ is the depreciation rate and is assumed to be 5% per year and tI is investment 
in year t. The base year capital stock, 0K , is approximated by six times of the base 
year investment, 0I . 
 
Labour Input 
 
Ideally, we should use the total weighted hours of work by different skill levels. 
However, total hours of work and skill compositions of the labour force are not 
readily available for Hong Kong in long time series. We simply use the number of 
employed people as our measure of labour input. For Hong Kong, this data is 
available on the homepage of the Census and Statistics Department. The data for 
Taiwan are acquired from the same database mentioned above. For all other 
economies, they are available from the International Labour Office’s LABORSTA 
database and the relevant governments’ homepages.  
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Capital and Labour Income Shares  
 
The sum of the capital income share and labour income share equals unity 
( 1=+ LK ss ) under the assumption of constant return to scale. So if we have the 
figure on labour income share Ls , the capital income share, Ks , is simply Ls−1 . As 
the labour income share is the ratio of total compensation over GDP, we need to have 
the data on total compensation in order to know the labour income share. For Hong 
Kong, the total compensation data is provided by the Census and Statistics 
Department. The data for Taiwan is again available from the same database mentioned 
before. For all other economies, they are either estimated from the hourly pay and 
hours of work data from the LABORSTA or statistics published by the government.  
 
Comparison with past studies 
 
Many studies have been carried out to estimate the TFP for East Asia countries. We 
summarize the results of some of the most influential studies that were done during 
the past decade along with our own for comparison. They are in the Table A1 below. 
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Table A1. Comparisons of TFP Estimates for Selected East Asian Economies 
Study Country Data 
period 
Methodology Average TFP 
growth rate 
Hong Kong 2.5 
Singapore 0.1 
South Korea 1.1 
Young (1994) 
Taiwan 
1970-1985 
 
 
 
Econometric 
1.5 
Hong Kong 0 - 2.4 
Singapore 0 - 0.4 
South Korea -0.5 - 1.2 
Kim and Lau  
(1994) 
Taiwan 
1966-1990 Econometric &  
growth accounting 
0 - 1.2 
Hong Kong 2.3 
Singapore 0.2 
South Korea 1.7 
Young (1995) 
Taiwan 
1966-1990 Growth accounting 
2.6 
Singapore 1.5 
South Korea 1.5 
Collins and  
Bosworth  
(1996) Taiwan 
1960-1994 Growth accounting 
2.0 
Hong Kong 4.4 
Singapore 3.3 
South Korea 2.5 
Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997) 
Taiwan 
1960-1985 Growth accounting 
3.0 
Hong Kong 1966-1991 1.98-2.92 
Singapore 1968-1990 1.65-1.89 
South Korea 1966-1990 1.62-2.07 
Hsieh (2002) 
Taiwan 1966-1990 
Growth accounting 
(dual approach) 
3.36-3.87 
Hong Kong 3.5 
Singapore 3.1 
South Korea 3.3 
Taiwan 3.4 
Iwata, Khan and 
Murao (2003) 
China 
1960-1995 Non-parametric 
3.0 
Thangavelu (2004) Singapore 1970-1998 Growth accounting -1.03 
Hong Kong 3.35 
Singapore 2.68 
South Korea 1.52 
Ferreira, Pessoa 
and Veloso 
(2005) 
Taiwan 
1960-2000 Growth accounting 
1.97 
Islam, Dai and 
Sakamoto (2006) 
China 1978-2002 Growth accounting 
(dual approach) 
3.23-4.08 
Li (2006) Hong Kong 1981-2000 Growth accounting 0.86 
Ours Hong Kong 1980-2005 1.12 
 Singapore 1980-2003 1.02 
 South Korea 1980-2005 0.93 
 Taiwan 1980-2005 1.31 
 China 1980-2005 
Growth accounting 
4.11 
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Technical Appendix 2: Analysis on Unit Labour Costs 
 
The Unit Labour Cost 
 
The unit labour cost is commonly defined as the labour cost needed to produce one 
unit of output in a particular sector/industry or for the whole economy. It is often 
measured as the ratio of labour cost per unit of labour over the productivity of labour. 
This shows that an economy can improve its competitiveness by either containing the 
increase of its labour cost or raising its productivities. Labour compensation per unit 
of labour is either the wage rate or the total labour compensation per employee or per 
hours of employment. Since the total labour compensation reflects better the true 
labour cost it is the more desirable measure used for this purpose. Also, as the unit 
labour cost aims to capture the labour cost of producing a constant unit of output at 
any particular time, the numerator, the labour cost per unit of labour, is measured in 
nominal rather than real terms while the denominator, the productivity of labour, is 
measured in real or volume terms. So for calculation of the unit labour cost (ULC) the 
following formula is used: 
 
Y
TC
L
Y
L
TCULC == )/()(                  (6) 
 
where TC stands for total nominal labour compensation; L is total labour input (total 
number of workers or hours of work); and Y stands for real output. To calculate the 
ULC for the whole economy, Y is the real GDP and TC is the nominal total labour 
compensation in the national accounts. The figures in the national accounts are 
favoured as they are more comprehensive, consistent and comparable across different 
sectors. We measure the ULC for the whole Hong Kong economy as well as for 
different sectors (9 sectors in total: manufacturing, import/export, hotel and 
restaurants, transportation and storage, communication, finance and insurance, 
wholesale and retail, real estate and other business services). 
 
The Cross-country Comparison of ULC 
 
To make cross-country comparisons of ULC, both the denominator and the numerator 
 36
of the ULC have to be made comparable. Hence, TC needs to be measured in common 
currency unit, often in US dollars. It is more difficult to make Y comparable across 
countries as Y meant to measure the real “quantity unit” of output produced and the 
real GDP of different countries may not measure the same “quantity unit”. So we need 
to make adjustment for GDP using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). A commonly used 
PPP adjustment method recommended by the United Nations Statistics Division is the 
Geary-Khamis (G-K) method. This is an aggregation method in which “category 
international prices” (reflecting relative category values) and country PPPs (depicting 
relative country price levels) are estimated simultaneously from a system of linear 
equations. It has the properties of base-country invariance, matrix consistency and 
transitivity as defined by the United Nations Statistics Division. The ULC used for 
international comparison can be expressed as: 
 
pppGK
US
Y
TC
ULC
−
= $              (7) 
 
For international comparisons, we compare ULC of Hong Kong with the Mainland 
China, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. Since it is impossible to get the same 
sectoral breakdown for all these economies as we do for Hong Kong, we only divide 
sectors into manufacturing and services. However, we have to bear in mind that there 
are several limitations of using ULC as a measure of international competitiveness. 
First, the ULC measure only takes into account labour cost, and it does not include the 
capital costs and costs for intermediate inputs. Both of these two latter categories of 
costs can take quite significant shares in total costs, and capital costs in particular can 
vary significantly across countries. Second, the measure only reflects cost 
competitiveness. Other factors, such as innovative capabilities, quality of goods and 
services, have not been accounted for by the measure. Third, international 
competitiveness may be also affected by various trade barriers and political factors 
that also cannot be captured by the ULC.     
 
A ULC-based Real Effective Exchange Rate Measure 
 
For international comparisons of ULC, it is useful if we can derive an overall measure 
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of cost competitiveness of a country in comparison with its major trade partners. A 
ULC-based real exchange rate measure (ULC-REER) serves for that purpose and has 
been widely used by many including the US Bureau of Labour Statistics when making 
international comparisons. The ULC-REER is defined as below: 
 
1
-
n
i
i i i
ULCULC REER
eULC
α
=
= ∑            (8) 
 
where iα  is the weight for country i, determined by country i’s share of trade in  
home country’s total trade (the ratio of bilateral trade between the home country and 
country i to the total exports and imports of the home country); ie  is the nominal 
exchange rate between country i and the home country. Hence, this ULC-REER 
measure simply replaces the price level with ULC in the measure of real effective 
exchange rate, and can therefore be interpreted similarly to REER. It captures the 
change of home country’s ULC relative to its main trade partners’. The merit of 
ULC-REER is that it represents an overall measure of relative competitiveness of an 
economy. The major trade partners for Hong Kong in our computation of ULC-based 
REER include: the Mainland China, US, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, UK 
and Germany. They together account for over 90% Hong Kong’s total foreign trade.   
 
The Data 
 
We need the following data: (1) real GDP and GK-PPP adjusted GDP, and real output 
by sectors; (2) total labour compensation for the economy as a whole and by sectors; 
(3) US dollar exchange rates for various countries; and (4) trade shares of Hong 
Kong’s major trade partners. Our data sources for different economies are as follows: 
 
Hong Kong 
 
2006 Gross Domestic Product published by the Census and Statistics Department, and 
the total labour compensation data directly obtained from the Census and Statistics 
Department.  
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The Mainland China 
 
The database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, the 
International Labour Office’s LABORSTA database and the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. 
 
Taiwan 
 
The database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the 
National Statistics of Taiwan. 
 
Korea 
 
The database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, the 
International Labour Office’s LABORSTA database and the Korean National 
Statistical Office.  
 
Singapore 
 
The database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, the 
International Labour Office’s LABORSTA database and the Singapore Official 
Statistics.  
 
The ULC measures for all other countries are from the database maintained by the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre. 
 
 39
Technical Appendix 3: Dynamic Shift-Share Analysis of Hong Kong’s Export 
Sector 
 
DSSA Methodology 
 
The dynamic shift-share analysis (DSSA) is a well established method which has been 
extensively used in the study of trade competitiveness. It has been applied in MAS 
(2002) to study the trade competitiveness of Singapore and in Ha, Fan and Shu (2003) 
to study the trade competitiveness of Hong Kong vis-à-vis the Mainland China. 
 
Consider the home economy in a group of reference economies exporting the same 
categories of commodities to the same destination markets. Let ijtX  be the home 
economy’s export of commodity i to its destination market j in time period t. Similar, 
let ijtX
?
 be the reference group’s total export of commodity i to the destination market 
j in time period t. Any difference between a country’s export change, 1
ij ij
t tX X −− , and 
the part of the total change in exports that might be ascribed to the rate of export 
growth of the reference group as a whole, 11
1 1
1
ij ij
j t t
t j ij
t t
X XX
X X
−
−
− −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
? ?
? ? , is the so-called net 
shift, which can be further decomposed into three separate effects: industry mix effect 
(IME), competitive effect (CE), and interaction effect (IE). In particular, we have 
 
( ) 11 1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1
1 Net Shift
   1 Industry Mix Effect (IME)
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t t t j ij
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− − − −
⎞⎜ ⎟⎠
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? ?
? ?
 
 
The total effect of IME, CE, and IE can also be obtained by summing over all the 
commodities, i.e., 
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The industry mix effect measures the part in net shift that may be ascribed to the 
difference in export structure between a particular economy and the reference group 
as a whole. The competitive effect measures the part in net shift that may come from 
the difference in export growth rate between a particular economy and the reference 
group as a whole. The interactive effect measures the part in net shift that may be 
attributed to the interaction between export structure and competitiveness. 
 
Data 
 
Because the target economy of our research is Hong Kong, the reference economies, 
the destination markets, and the relevant exports of commodities and services are 
drawn according to their relative importance to Hong Kong. In this study, we consider 
the USA, EU, Japan, the World, and the Mainland China as the destination markets. 
The reference economies are China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
Taiwan (the actual list may vary conditional on data availability). The reason for the 
inclusion of these economies is that they are all close competitors of Hong Kong. 
 
Commodity Trade Data 
According to the Annual Review of Hong Kong External Merchandise Trade (2005), 
clothing, electronic components, textiles, jewellery and precious stones, office 
machines and components account for more than 70% of Hong Kong’s total export. 
Figures A1-A3 show the export structure of Hong Kong by total export, re-export and 
domestic export, in SITC 1 digit classifications. Note that commodities of SITC 6 to 8, 
which comprise textiles, electronics, miscellaneous manufactured articles, account for 
a major proportion of the export of Hong Kong. For the total export and the re-export, 
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the share of miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8) is declining during our 
sample period while for domestic export it is relatively stable. For machinery and 
transportation equipment (SITC 7), their shares are growing in terms of total export 
and re-export, which accounts for the largest share in 2005. 
 
Figure A1. Total Export Structure of Hong Kong (SITC 1 digit classification) 
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* Source: United Nation COMTRADE database 
 
 
Figure A2. Re-export Structure of Hong Kong 
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* Source: United Nation COMTRADE database 
 
 42
Figure A3. Domestic Export Structure of Hong Kong 
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* Source: United Nation COMTRADE database 
 
 
Due to data availability, we choose the following five product categories for our 
DSSA study: 
 
? Textile, fabric, yarn, etc. (SITC 65)  
? Office machines (SITC 75)  
? Telecommunications, sound equipments, etc. (SITC 76)  
? Transistors, valves, etc. (SITC 776)  
? Clothing and accessories (SITC 84) 
 
These data are available from the United Nation’s COMTRADE database7. The 
sample period is from 1992 to 2004. Figure A4 shows the total trade value for the 5 
selected commodity subcategories, Figure A5 and A6 show the compositions of 
export of the reference group in 1992 and 2004. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm for more details. 
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Figure A4. Movement of Export Trade Value for the 5 Selected Commodities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5. Composition of Export of the Reference Group in 1992 
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Figure A6. Composition of Export of the Reference Group in 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In MAS (2002), similar method was employed to check Singapore’s export strengths 
and weaknesses by using mainly three-digit categories, while we use mainly two-digit 
categories with an extra three-digit category in our study. Because the Singapore 
research focuses on electronic related product exports which account for a significant 
share of the total export of Singapore, using primarily three-digit categories are more 
suitable in their case. However, several different industries account for an important 
share of Hong Kong’s total export, choosing primarily two-digit categories are more 
appropriate here. 
 
Service Trade Data 
According to the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong (CSDHK), 
transportation, travel, finance, insurance and other business services are the main 
service export industries of Hong Kong. Consequently, the above five categories of 
service export are selected for the DSSA study. They are: 
 
? Transportation: movement of goods, rental, carriage and relative supporting 
services 
? Travel: goods and services consumed by travellers 
? Insurance: net premium for reinsurance, life, general, freight insurance 
? Finance: financial intermediary and auxiliary activities 
? Other business: mainly trade related services 
The compostion of export of the reference group in 2004
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Al
l
Ch
ina
Ho
ng
Ko
ng
Do
me
sti
c
Re
ex
po
rt
Ko
rea
Ma
lay
sia
Sin
ga
po
re
Ta
iw
an
Th
ail
an
d
SITC 84
SITC 776
SITC 76
SITC 75
SITC 65
 45
The above data are available from the Balance of Payment Statistics (BOP) published 
by IMF (August 2006). The sample period is from 1995 to 2004, with “the world” as 
the only destination market. No data can be retrieved for Taiwan. 
 
DSSA Estimation Results 
 
The DSSA generates a huge number of figures describing the net shift, the IME effect, 
the CE effect, and the IE effect. We report only the net shift effects here due to space 
concerns. These figures are organized below for reference:8 
• Net shift in commodity exports to the world market, with or without China, for 
the five SITC items. (2 by 5 = 10 figures)  
• Net shift in commodity exports, with domestic export and re-export treated as 
separate entities, to the US, the EU, and Japan markets, respectively, with or 
without China in the reference group, for the five SITC items. (3 by 2 by 5 = 
30 figures) 
• Net shift in commodity exports, with domestic export and re-export treated as 
separate entities, China market, for the five SITC items. (1 by 5 = 5 figures) 
• Net shift in service export to the world market, with or without China in the 
reference group, for the five service items. (2 by 5 = 10 figures) 
 
Commodity export to world markets  
 
1. With China 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to the World Market
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8 For the other effects, the figures are available upon request. 
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Net Shifts of SITC 75 Export to the World Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 Export to the World Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to the World Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to the World Market
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2. Without China 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to the World Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 75 Export to World Markets (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 Export to the World Markets (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to the World Markets (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to the World Markets (without China)
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Commodity export (with HK domestic & re-export as separate entities) 
1. With China (Export to the US market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to US Market
-300000
-200000
-100000
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China
HK Re-export
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand 
Taiwan
HK Domestic export
 
 
 
Net Shifts of SITC 75 Export to US Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to US Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to US Market
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2. With China (to the EU market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to EU Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 75 export to EU Markets
-2000000
-1000000
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
China
HK Re-export
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand 
Taiwan
HK Domestic export
 
 
 
Net Shifts of SITC 76 Export to EU Market
-1000000
-500000
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
China
HK Re-export
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand 
Taiwan
HK Domestic export
 
 
 
Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to EU Market
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to EU Market
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3. With China (to Japan market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 export to Japan Markets
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 export to Japan Markets
-600000
-400000
-200000
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China
HK Re-export
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand 
Taiwan
HK Domestic export
 
 
 
Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to Japan Market
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4. Without China (to the US market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to US Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 export to US Markets(without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to US Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to US Market (without China)
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5. Without China (to the EU market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to EU Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 75 Export to EU Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 Export to EU Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to EU Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to EU Market (without China)
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6. Without China (to Japan market) 
Net Shifts of SITC 65 Export to Japan Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 76 export to Japan Markets(without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 776 Export to Japan Market (without China)
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Net Shifts of SITC 84 Export to Japan Market (without China)
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7. Export to China market 
Net Shift of SITC 65 Export to China Market
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Net Shift of SITC 76 Export to China Market
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Net Shift of SITC 776 Export to China Market
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Net Shift of SITC 84 Export to China Market
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Service Export to the World Market 
1. With China 
Net Shifts of Transportation Services Export to the World Market
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Net Shifts of Travel Services Export to the World Market
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Net Shifts of Other Services Export to the World Market
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2. Without China 
Net Shifts of Transportation Services Export to the World Market
(without China)
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Net Shifts of Travel Services Export to the World Market 
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Net Shifts of Insurance Services Export to the World Market 
(without China)
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Net Shifts of Finance Services Export to the World Market 
(without China)
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